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I. INTRODUCTION

Buried deep in its June 2007 judicial rebuke and disapproval of the
Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC") recent policy decision to
punish television broadcasters for airing isolated and fleeting expletives,'
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Fox Television
Stations, Inc. v. FCC made a seemingly minor and inconsequential
evidentiary observation. The appellate court wrote that the FCC's edict in
2004 to rein in such language 3 "is devoid of any evidence that suggests a
fleeting expletive is harmful, let alone establishes that this harm is serious
enough to warrant government regulation. '4 Contending that "[s]uch
evidence would seem to be particularly relevant today when children likely
hear this language far more often from other sources than they did in the
1970s when the Commission first began sanctioning indecent speech, ' 5 the
two-judge majority of the Second Circuit openly questioned whether there
was really any problem to begin with6 and concluded that the FCC had
"failed to explain how its current policy would remedy the purported
'problem' or to point to supporting evidence." 7

1. See Stephen Labaton, Decency Ruling Thwarts F.C.C. on Vulgarities, N.Y. TIMES,
June 5, 2007, at Al (calling the appellate court's decision "a sharp rebuke for the F.C.C. and
for the Bush administration"); see Jim Puzzanghera, FCC Efforts on Indecency Dealt
Setback, L.A. TIMES, June 5, 2007, at CI (referring to the appellate court's decision as a
"strong rebuke" that "repudiated the Federal Communications Commission's recent
crackdown on broadcast indecency").
2. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 461 (2d Cir. 2007).
3. See Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding the Airing of the
"Golden Globe Awards" Program, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975,
para.
12,
Release
No.
FCC
04-43
(Mar.
18,
2004),
available at
http://qallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-04-43A1.pdf (declaring that "the
mere fact that specific words or phrases are not sustained or repeated does not mandate a
finding that material that is otherwise patently offensive to the broadcast medium is not
indecent," and concluding that "[w]hile prior Commission and staff action have indicated
that isolated or fleeting broadcasts of the 'F-Word' such as that here are not indecent or
would not be acted upon, consistent with our decision today we conclude that any such
interpretation is no longer good law."). See generally Clay Calvert, Bono, the Culture Wars,
and a ProfaneDecision: The FCC'sReversal of Course on Indecency Determinationsand
Its New Path on Profanity, 28 SEATrLE U. L. REv. 61 (2004) (analyzing and criticizing the
FCC's decision to punish the broadcast of fleeting expletives).
4. Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d at 461.
5. Id.
6. See id. (writing that the FCC's November 2006 Remand Order, regarding the use of
fleeting expletives, in Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between
February2, 2002 and March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R 13299, Release No. FCC 06-166 (Nov. 6,
2006) ("provides no reasoned analysis of the purported 'problem' it is seeking to address
with its new indecency policy from which this court can conclude that such regulation of
speech is reasonable").
7. Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d at 461.
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This reasoning certainly supports the appellate court's conclusion that
the FCC's sudden policy shift to fining broadcasters for airing fleeting
8
expletives after many years of having tolerated (if not ignored) them is
9
"arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act." But the
implications of the court's logic about the lack of evidentiary support for
proving harm or injury caused by speech are far more profound and freespeech friendly than their application either to the narrow facts of Fox
Television Stations'° or to the FCC's general statutory authority to regulate
indecent" and profane' 2 expression.13 Indeed, this Article contends that the
appellate court's thinking about the government's burden of providing
evidence of real harm and actual injury caused by offensive messages on
television is equally as applicable to several other current efforts to regulate

8. See id. at 452, 455 (finding that "there is no question that the FCC has changed its
policy" and observing that, prior to its 2004 decision declaring a Golden Globe Awards
broadcast indecent and profane because of the isolated use of the phrase "really, really
fucking brilliant" by U2 singer Bono during an acceptance speech, "the FCC had
consistently taken the view that isolated, non-literal, fleeting expletives did not run afoul of
its indecency regime.").
9. Id.at 447.
10. The factual scenario centered on challenges to the FCC's determination that two
Fox broadcasts, one of the 2002 Billboard Music Awards and the other of the 2003
Billboard Music Awards, were both indecent and profane due to the use of fleeting
expletives. See id.at 446-54. In the former broadcast, singer Cher stated during an
acceptance speech, "People have been telling me I'm on the way out every year, right? So
fuck 'em." Id. at 452. In the latter broadcast, Simple Life reality TV star Nicole Richie
queried, "Have you ever tried to get cow shit out of a Prada purse? It's not so fucking
simple." Id. Two other FCC decisions, one involving various episodes of ABC's NYPD Blue
series that involved use of the words "bullshit," "dick," and "dickhead," and the other
involving an episode of The Early Show on CBS in which a guest used the term
"bullshitter," were initially at issue in the case. Id. The FCC, however, later dismissed on
procedural grounds the complaint against NYPD Blue and reversed its finding on The Early
Show, because it occurred within the context of a bona fide news interview. See id.at 45354.
11. The FCC defines indecent speech "as material that, in context, depicts or describes
sexual or excretory activities or organs in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium." Pacifica Foundation,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 56 F.C.C. 2d 94, 98 (1975).
12. The FCC defines profane language as that which is "so grossly offensive to
members of the public who actually hear it as to amount to a nuisance." Federal
Communications Commission, Consumer Facts: Obscene, Indecent, and Profane
Broadcasts, http://www.fcc.gov/cgb/consumerfacts/obscene.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2008).
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2007) (providing that "[w]hoever utters any obscene,
indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.") (emphasis added). See generally B.
Chad Bungard, Indecent Exposure: An Economic Approach to Removing the Boob from the
Tube, 13 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 187 (2006) (providing a relatively recent and comprehensive
review of the FCC's authority over indecent broadcast expression and its latest indecency
rulings).
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sexual and/or violent content conveyed on other media. For instance, the
same evidentiary problems arise repeatedly today when state and local
government entities across the nation attempt to14 legislatively limit minors'
access to video games depicting violent images.
Perhaps more importantly, the Second Circuit's observation regarding
the common use of expletives today in society-that "children likely hear
this language far more often from other sources"' 5-not only demonstrates
the inherent difficulty the government faces on the causation question of
parsing out and controlling for factors other than media influences that
could cause harm, but it suggests an often fatal problem that plagues the
regulation of sexual and/or violent content on any specific medium like
video games, the Internet, or television. Specifically, the predicament is
that such medium-specific laws directed at censorship of a particular type
of content' 6-violent or sexual imagery, for example-are almost by
definition underinclusive remedies 17 that fail to materially cure or solve
whatever problem supposedly exists.18 For instance, a statute that regulates
14. See, e.g., Entm't Software Ass'n v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1069, 1070 (D.
Minn. 2006) (concluding that the social science evidence offered by Minnesota to support
its violent video game statute is "completely insufficient to demonstrate an empirical, causal
link between video games and violence in minors," and adding that "[i]t is impossible to
determine from the data presented whether violent video games cause violence, or whether
violent individuals are attracted to violent video games.").
15. Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d at 461.
16. Content-based laws are subject to the rigorous strict scrutiny standard of judicial
review, under which the government must prove both that the law in question is justified by
"a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest." Fed. Election
Comm'n v. Wisc. Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652, 2664 (2007). In determining whether
a regulation is narrowly tailored under the strict scrutiny standard, the Supreme Court has
observed that "[i]f a less restrictive alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the
legislature must use that alternative." United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803,
813 (2000).
17. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994) ("While surprising at first
glance, the notion that a regulation of speech may be impermissibly underinclusive is firmly
grounded in basic First Amendment principles"); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,
475 U.S. 41, 58 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that while the Supreme Court
"frequently has upheld underinclusive classifications on the sound theory that a legislature
may deal with one part of a problem without addressing all of it," this reasoning "has less
force when a classification turns on the subject matter of expression.").
18. For example, Professor Christopher M. Fairman of the Ohio State University Moritz
College of Law argues in a recent law journal article that there is:
[A] glaring underinclusiveness with any attempt at speech regulation by the FCC.
Its indecency regulations only apply to free, broadcast media. The rise of cable
television and satellite radio provide attractive alternatives to broadcast
personalities like Howard Stern who want to be free of FCC harassment. Given
the dramatic number of new subscriptions to Sirius Satellite Radio - Stem's new
media host - the FCC's preoccupation withfrck is out of step with the perceptions
of millions of Americans. In fact, commentary by the Commissioners themselves
identifying increased media tolerance of taboo words as justification for increased
FCC vigilance further demonstrates that the Commission is out of touch: most
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and limits minors' access to violent video games because such images and
plots ostensibly harm the children who play those games fails to cure
whatever problem may exist from viewing violence generally because
minors still can watch violent images on television' 9 and the Internet,20 in
the movies 2' and, for many kids, in the real world (consider, for instance,
child abuse, spousal abuse in which a father batters a mother, schoolyard
fights and bullying, street crime, brawls during sporting events, etc.).2 2 U.S.
District Court Judge James J. Brady, in fact, adopted this
underinclusiveness line of reasoning when, in August 2006, he enjoined on
First Amendment grounds Louisiana's statute "prohibiting and
criminalizing the sale, lease or rental of video or computer games that
appeal to a minor's morbid interest in violence. '23 Judge Brady, after
observing that video games constitute merely "a tiny fraction of the media
violence to which modem American children are exposed,, 24 wrote that:
people are simply not shocked byfuck anymore.
Christopher M. Fairman, Fuck, 28 CARDOZO L. REv. 1711, 1747-48 (2007).
19. For instance, in September 2007, the Parents Television Council released a report
claiming "that children watching television during the first hour of prime time are assaulted
by violence, profanity or sexual content once every 3.5 minutes of non-commercial airtime."
Press Release, Parents Television Council, PTC Study: Broadcast TV Family Hour Fare
Filthier Than Ever, Sept. 5, 2007, available at http://www.parentstv.org/PTC/publications/
release/2007/0905.asp (emphasis added). The report's executive summary asserts that
"[s]ince 2000-2001, violent content during the Family Hour has increased by 52.4%." See
Parent's Television Council, The Alarming Family Hour . . . No Place for Children: A
Content Analysis of Sex, Foul Language and Violence During Network Television's Family
Hour,
http://www.parentstv.org/PTC/publications/reports/familyhour/familyhour-92007finalPDF.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2008).
20. For instance, the beheading of Nicholas Berg, an American kidnapped by Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi, was shown "on a tape circulated on the Internet." Edward Wong &
James Glanz, South Korean is Killed in Iraq By His Captors, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2004, at
Al. Similarly, the beheading of Eugene "Jack" Armstrong, a kidnapped American
contractor, was posted on the Internet. See Steve Fainaru, Militants in Iraq Release Video of
U.S. Captive's Beheading, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2004, at Al. There is nothing, under the
law in the United States, that prevents a minor from accessing such morbidly violent tapes
on the Internet.
21. See Richard Corliss, Blood on the Streets, TIME, Mar. 30, 2007, at 128 (observing
that "[k]ids can get violent images from movies, TV, DVDs, the Internet") (emphasis
added).
22. This, in fact, was a major problem with a Washington state statute limiting minors'
access to certain violent video games. In striking down Washington's law, U.S. District
Court Judge Robert S. Lasnik called the regulation underinclusive and wrote that it "is too
narrow in that it will have no effect on the many other channels through which violent
representations are presented to children." Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F.
Supp. 2d 1180, 1189 (W.D. Wash. 2004). He thus concluded that even if Washington was
"able to show a causal connection between violent video games and real-life aggression in
minors, the record does not support a finding that the Act is likely to curb such aggression in
a direct and material way." Id.
23. Entm't Software Ass'n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823, 825 (M.D. La. 2006).
24. Id. at 833.
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[T]he [Louisiana] Statute leaves these other media unaffected. Under
the Statute, for example, a minor could be legally barred from buying
or renting an "M"-rated video game containing violent content, but the
same minor could legally buy or rent the movie or book on which the
video game was based. Courts have noted that this type of facial
underinclusiveness undermines
25 the claim that the regulation materially
advances its alleged interests.

The social reality that underlies such judicial logic is that sexual and
violent imagery is pervasive today in our popular culture,26 and laws that
single out for censorship particular forms of media-television, video
games or the Internet, for instance-that convey such content are simply
futile efforts that fail to resolve anything when other media (and culture
more generally) are left unregulated. As the late Justice William Brennan
pointed out more than two decades ago, when First Amendment interests
are at stake, a "one-step-at-a-time analysis [of a problem] is wholly
inappropriate. 2 7 Similarly, current Justice Antonin Scalia has noted that a
"law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order, and
thus as justifying a restriction upon truthful speech, when ' it28 leaves
appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.
This Article thus contends that the quandary facing legislators today
who want to suppress First Amendment-protected mediated images of
sexual 29 and violent conduct 3 ° is twofold, boiling down to proof of

25. Id.(emphasis added).
26. See SISSELA BOK, MAYHEM: VIOLENCE AS PUBLIC ENTERTAINMENT 4 (1998)
(asserting that violent images are "reflected, repeated and echoed in endless variations
through the lens of entertainment violence, suffusing movies and TV screens, filling the
airwaves, recounted in best-selling novels"); See Pamela Paul, PORNIFIED: HOW
PRONOGRAPHY IS TRANSFORMING OUR LIVES, OUR RELATIONSHIPS, AND OUR FAMILIES 4, 5
(2005) (writing that "[t]oday, pornography is so seamlessly integrated into popular culture
that embarrassment or surreptitiousness is no longer part of the equation," asserting that
"[tihe all-pornography, all-the-time mentality is everywhere in today's pomified culture,"
and noting that "[p]op music is intimately connected with the pornography industry as
today's pop stars embrace and exalt the joys of porn. Eminem, Kid Rock, Blink 182,
Metallica, Everclear, and Bon Jovi have all featured pom performers in their music
videos."). See also Karen MacPherson, Is Childhood Becoming Oversexed?, PrrT. POSTGAZETTE, May 8, 2005, at A-1 (describing how "[c]hild development experts worry that
such a sex-saturated culture encourages children and young adults to define themselves
mainly by how sexy they are, and to see sex as the most important quality in a successful
relationship.").
27. See City ofRenton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 58 (1986) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
28. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541-42 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations
omitted).
29. Images of sexual conduct deemed by courts to be obscene or child pornography,
however, are not protected by the First Amendment. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
535 U.S. 234, 245-46 (2002) (providing that "[a]s a general principle, the First Amendment
bars the government from dictating what we see or read or speak or hear. The freedom of
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causation on two very different levels. First, the government must prove
actual harm caused by the speech in question as it is conveyed on a specific
medium-not, in other words, the aggregate effect or collective injury from
viewing all media violence generally-that is sufficient to overcome First
Amendment free speech rights.31 Second, even if sufficient harm and injury
from viewing violent or sexual content on a particular medium can be
proven by social science research or some other method, the government
then must turn around and prove that its legislative remedy-its censorship
of the allegedly harmful expression conveyed via a specific mediumactually causes the problem to be reduced, mitigated, or otherwise
ameliorated in a significant way.

speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation,
incitement, obscenity and pornographyproduced with real children.") (emphasis added).
30. Violent imagery is protected by the First Amendment. See Video Software Dealers
Ass'n v. Webster, 773 F. Supp. 1275, 1278 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (holding that "[u]nlike
obscenity, violent expression is protected by the First Amendment."). Courts refuse to treat
it like obscenity, which is not protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., James v. Meow
Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 698 (6th Cir. 2000) (writing that "[w]e decline to extend our
obscenity jurisprudence to violent, instead of sexually explicit, material."). What's more,
violent imagery is protected even when it is directed at minors, unless the government can
pass the rigorous strict scrutiny standard of judicial review for a limitation imposed upon
such content. See Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 401 F. Supp. 2d 1034,
1045 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (stating that "[t]he prevailing view, and the one this court will follow,
is that limitations on a minor's access to violent expression are subject to strict scrutiny.").
See generally KENT R. MIDDLETON & WILLIAM E. LEE, THE LAW OF PUBLIC
COMMUNICATION 420 (2007) (writing that "American courts have never found that violence
alone lacks First Amendment protection. Violence is not included in the definition of
obscenity"). To hold that violent imagery was not protected would gut many public libraries
and museums of, respectively, famous novels and paintings. As Professor Paul E.
Salamanca of the University of Kentucky College of Law observes in a recent article,
"excluding violent imagery from the protective ambit of the First Amendment would
exclude so much of what we consider classic art and literature that we would be left with
only remnants of the western canon." Paul E. Salamanca, Video Games as a ProtectedForm
of Expression, 40 GA. L. REv. 153, 191 (2005). The fact that images of sex and violence
may be conveyed for purely entertainment-based purposes does not eliminate or remove
First Amendment protection. As the United States Supreme Court has observed,
"[e]ntertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures,
programs broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and
dramatic works, fall within the First Amendment guarantee." Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981).
31. It is important to note here that the speech rights involved in these scenarios include
those of both the creators of the speech (the individuals, for instance, who design violent
video games) and the recipients of the speech (the users/players of the video games). Thus,
in describing the speech interests at stake when enjoining Indianapolis's violent video game
statute in 2001, Judge Richard Posner wrote for a unanimous three-judge block of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that "[c]hildren have First
Amendment rights" and that "the right of parents to enlist the aid of the state to shield their
Am.
children from ideas of which the parents disapprove cannot be plenary ....
Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 576, 577 (7th Cir. 2001).
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Put more bluntly, two knotty questions now face governmental
entities in these circumstances: 1) Proving Harm: Can they prove that a
specific form or type of content conveyed on a specific medium actually
causes harm, independent of other causal and contributory factors, that is
serious enough to overcome constitutional concerns?; 32 and 2) Proving
Redress: Can they prove that the censorial remedy they adopt actually
reduces or remedies the problem in a material way?
The importance of these twin questions cannot be overestimated
today. In particular, states across the nation seem fixated on limiting
minors' access to violent images and plots in video games, 33 with each
effort ultimately proving unconstitutional.3 4 The FCC, apparently
undaunted and undeterred by such growing judicial precedent against
regulating images of violence, wants the government to grant it new
authority to regulate images of violence on broadcast, cable, and satellite
television, 35 and it believes that "developing an appropriate definition of

32. For instance, when U.S. District Court Judge Ronald M. Whyte in August 2007
declared unconstitutional California's statute limiting minors' access to violent video
games, he explained the first level of the causation quandary, stating:
[T]here has been no showing that violent video games as defined in the Act, in the
absence of other violent media, cause injury to children. In addition, the evidence
does not establish that video games, because of their interactive nature or
otherwise, are any more harmful than violent television, movies, internet sites or
other speech-related exposures. Although some reputable professional individuals
and organizations have expressed particular concern about the interactive nature
of video games, there is no generally-accepted study that supports that concern.
Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57472, *32 (N.D.
Cal. 2007) (emphasis in original).
33. State laws were enjoined by federal courts in the following cases: Video Software
Dealers Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57472 (N. D. Cal. 2007); Entm't
Software Ass'n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Entm't Software
Ass'n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823 (M.D. La. 2006); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Granholm,
426 F. Supp. 2d 646 (E.D. Mich. 2006); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d
1065 (D. Minn. 2006); Entm't Software Ass'n v. Henry, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74186
(E.D. Okla. 2006); and Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, 325 F. Supp. 2d 1180
(W.D. Wash. 2004). Local laws were enjoined by federal appellate courts in Interactive
Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003) and Am.
Amusement Machine Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001). See Seth Schiesel,
Courts Block Laws On Game Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007, at El (reporting a
federal judge's ruling striking down California's violent video game law in August 2007
and noting how similar laws have been declared unconstitutional in Washington, Illinois,
Michigan, Minnesota, Louisiana, and St. Louis County, Missouri.).
34. See generally Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Violence and Video Games 2006:
Legislation and Litigation, 8 Thx. REv. ENT. & SPORTS L. 49 (2007) (describing and
analyzing recent failed efforts of states to limit minors' access to violent video games).
35. See Violent Television Programming and Its Impact on Children, Report, MB
Docket No. 04-261, para. 5 (Apr. 25, 2007), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs
_public/attachmatch/FCC-07-50Al.pdf (urging that "action should be taken to address
violent programming").
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excessively violent programming would be possible. 36 At the same time
that it attempts to open up a new front on televised violence, the FCC
appears ready to continue its battle on indecent and profane content,
regardless of the appellate court's recent ruling in Fox Television
Stations.37

But it is more than just video game and television media for which
governmental entities want to censor sexual or violent expression. For
instance, Congress already has made several flawed and failed efforts to
regulate minors' access to non-obscene, sexual content3 8 on the Internet.39
36. Id. at para. 44.
37. For instance, Kevin J. Martin, chairman of the FCC, responded indignantly to the
appellate court's June 2007 decision in Fox Television Stations, declaring in a prepared
statement:
I completely disagree with the Court's ruling and am disappointed for American
families. I find it hard to believe that the New York court would tell American
families that "shit" and "fuck" are fine to say on broadcast television during the
hours when children are most likely to be in the audience.
The court even says the Commission is "divorced from reality." It is the New
York court, not the Commission, that is divorced from reality in concluding that
the word "fuck" does not invoke a sexual connotation.
Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, Statement of FCC Chairman Kevin
Martin on 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals Indecency Decision (June 4, 2007), available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-273602A1 .pdf.
38. It is important to emphasize the point that the unconstitutional parts of these
Intemet-based regulatory efforts involved attempts to squelch non-obscene speech. Obscene
speech falls outside the ambit of First Amendment protection and thus may be regulated
without raising the same constitutional concerns and questions. As the United States
Supreme Court put it a half-century ago, obscene expression is "not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
The current test for obscenity, which was established by the United States Supreme Court in
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), focuses on whether the material at issue: 1)
appeals to a prurient interest in sex, when taken as a whole and as judged by contemporary
community standards from the perspective of the average person; 2) is patently offensive, as
defined by state law; and 3) lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. In
contrast, non-obscene sexual content receives First Amendment protection. Sable
Commc'ns v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1986) (writing that "[s]exual expression which is
indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment").
39. Most recently, U.S. District Court Judge Lowell A. Reed, Jr. issued a permanent
injunction in March 2007 preventing enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act
(COPA) that "was designed to protect minors from exposure to sexually explicit materials
on the Web deemed harmful to them." ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775, 779 (E.D.
Pa. 2007). The case had previously worked its way up and back down the judicial system for
approximately eight years, with the names of three different attorneys general-Janet Reno,
John Ashcroft, and Alberto Gonzales-appearing as the captioned defendants along the
way. The case first worked its way up to the Supreme Court, after the COPA was enjoined
on a preliminary basis in 1999, on the narrow issue of whether the use of the term
"community standards" in COPA to identify "material that is harmful to minors" violated
the First Amendment. See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (issuing a
preliminary injunction against the COPA), aff'd, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000), vacated and
remanded,535 U.S. 564 (2002). On remand, the preliminary injunction was affirmed on the
grounds that "the ACLU will likely succeed on the merits in establishing that COPA is
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All of these medium-specific efforts-targeting media including
video games, television, and the Internet-are animated by an alleged (and
politically popular) desire to protect children from supposed harms caused
by sexual and violent expression, with some members of Congress even
calling for tens of millions of dollars in federal appropriations to conduct
further research on the potential harms to children from such media content
in 2007.40 The twin questions of first proving harm and then proving
redress thus are likely to be repeated again and again in the coming years as
legislators keep up their sustained assault on mediated images of sexual and
violent content.
The purpose of this Article is not to resolve whether or not social
science research can ever definitively prove via empirical evidence actual
harm caused by a particular form of mediated content that is sufficient to
survive judicial scrutiny.4 ' It also is not the Article's goal to question or
quibble with the value of the application of communication research and
theory to such questions 42 or to reject the idea that communication research

unconstitutional because it fails strict scrutiny and is overbroad." ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322
F.3d 240, 271 (3d Cir. 2003), aff'd and remanded, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). F.3d 240, 271 (3d
Cir. 2003), aff'd and remanded, 542 U.S. 656 (2004). A previous Congressional effort to
regulate non-obscene sexually explicit content in cyberspace, adopted in the name of
protecting minors, was the Communications Decency Act of 1996, and it too was enjoined
as unconstitutional. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)..
40. See Children and Media Research Advancement Act, S. 948, 110th Cong. § 2
(2007) (calling for appropriations of $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2008; $15,000,000 for
fiscal year 2009; $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2010; $25,000,000 for fiscal year 2011; and
$25,000,000 for fiscal year 2012 in order to allow the National Institute of Child Health and
Human Development to "examine the role and impact, both positive and negative, of
electronic media in children's and adolescents' cognitive, social, emotional, physical, and
behavioral development").
41. Even when social scientists acknowledge the failure to prove causation to date when
it comes to regulating video games depicting violent images, they still hold out hope for the
future. See Rene Weber et al., Aggression and Violence as Effects of Playing Video Games?,
in PLAYING VIDEO GAMES: MOTIVES, RESPONSES, AND CONSEQUENCES 347, 357 (Peter
Vorderer & Jennings Bryant eds., 2006) (writing that while "the current scientific evidence
on negative consequences of playing violent video games, as well as the confirmed effect
sizes, may be insufficient to ban violent video games" and despite acknowledging that "we
should not expect violent video games (or other games for that matter) to affect players
directly," the authors nonetheless call for funding for more research because of a "pattern of
significant, positive, rising and notable effect sizes from diverse best practice studies").
42. See generally Yorgo Pasadeos et al., Influences on the Media Law Literature: A
Divergence of Mass Communication Scholars and Legal Scholars?, 11 CoMM. L. & POL'Y
179, 188 (2006) (discussing mass communication law professors who have applied
communication research and theory to legal questions, noting that "[a]s the field evolved,
mass communication law scholars also incorporated empirical methodologies into media
law studies," and adding that "[m]uch important interdisciplinary work has been done in
media law that incorporates empirical methods or concepts from communication theory").
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can cast helpful light on legal issues.43 Professor Alan Garfield of Widener
University School of Law, in fact, addressed in an excellent 2005 law
journal article both the pros and cons of courts relying on (and requiring)
empirical evidence and social science research in attempts to prove harm to
minors who watch violent and/or sexual content and thereby to justify
censorial legislation. 44 Garfield, in brief, more than adequately explores the
problems (and benefits) when courts require empirical proof of harm and
the difficulties that legislators face when crafting laws designed to protect
children from certain media content, given that "proving a causal
antisocial behavior
connection between speech and children's emotions or
' 5
is not something that lends itself to empirical analysis. A
In addition to not addressing the problems that Professor Garfield
more than adequately examines, this Article does not focus on the very real
and equally serious problems of the inevitable vagueness challenges, under
the well-established void-for-vagueness doctrine,46 that face legislators
when they attempt to craft laws defining violence or sexually indecent
content. Indeed, vagueness has been an Achilles' heel for legislators both
when it comes to efforts to limit minors' access to non-obscene sexual
expression in cyberspace 47 and to restrict access to video games depicting
violence.48
43. See generally JEREMY COHEN & TIMOTHY GLEASON, SOCIAL RESEARCH IN
COMMUNICATION AND LAW 15 (1999) (contending there is "an intersection of interests
where law is based on behavioral and social assumptions about communication.").
44. See Alan E. Garfield, Protecting Children From Speech, 57 FLA. L. REv. 565, 60815 (2005) (discussing the use of social science research to prove harm to minors caused by
viewing media content and analyzing how courts use and consider that evidence (or lack
thereof) in their rulings on the constitutionality of statutes designed to shield children from
that media content).
45. Id. at 608-09. Garfield points out the danger in having judges require a finding of
causal proof of harm from speech where minors are concerned, noting that the sheer
"difficulty of proving a definitive causal connection between speech and harm should give
courts pause before invalidating child-protection censorship legislation for lack of empirical
proof." Id. at 610.
46. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (providing, in pertinent
is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if
part, that "[i]t
its prohibitions are not clearly defined" and that "we insist that laws give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may
act accordingly."). See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 910 (2d ed. 2002) (writing that "a law is unconstitutionally vague if a
reasonable person cannot tell what speech is prohibited and what is permitted. Unduly vague
laws violate due process whether or not speech is regulated").
47. See ACLU v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775, 778 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (concluding,
among other things, that the Child Online Protection Act "is impermissibly vague").
48. See Entm't Software Ass'n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823, 835-36 (M.D. La. 2006)
(writing that a statute "aimed at protecting minors" from violent content "must be clearly
drawn with standards that are reasonably precise," and finding Louisiana's video game
statute unconstitutionally vague because it "fails to provide specific definitions of prohibited

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 60

This Article, instead, focuses in Part II on the comparatively
underexplored implications of the second step, identified earlier as
"proving redress," of what this Article calls the two-step evidentiary and
causation quandary facing medium-specific laws. This Part, in particular,
lays out the major problem of underinclusion that arises with this step.
Then, in Part III, this Article explores the broader puzzle of precisely how
much evidence and what kind of evidence must be demonstrated by
legislative bodies in order to satisfy courts that the problems mediumspecific laws are designed to address are, in fact, remedied to a material
degree. In brief, how does the government actually prove that redress has
occurred or will occur? Ultimately, if courts continue to employ this twostep evidentiary and causation mode of judicial analysis, this Article argues
and concludes in Part IV that it will be nearly impossible for any mediumspecific effort to restrict minors' access to sexual and/or violent speech
ever to pass constitutional muster.
LI. PROVING REMEDY AND REDRESS OF SPEECH-CAUSED HARM
THROUGH CENSORSHIP: CAUGHT BETWEEN UNDERINCLUSIVE
REMEDIES AND OVERBROAD LAWS
Back in 2003, when the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit declared unconstitutional a St. Louis County, Missouri ordinance
that limited minors' access to so-called "graphically violent video
games, ' 49 it wrote that the County had the burden of proving "that the
recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will
in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way."5 ° While the
initial part of this quotation about the reality of recited harms relates to the
first step of the two-step evidentiary and causation quandary spelled out in
Part I, the emphasized (italicized) second part taps directly into the second
step in which the government must prove that its remedy of censorship
actually works in alleviating the problem.
Importantly, the Eighth Circuit was not making up or creating this
evidentiary rule on its own. It was, in fact, borrowing the language directly
from the Supreme Court's 1994 opinion in Turner BroadcastingSystem v.
FCC5 1 involving the constitutionality of the FCC's must-carry rules that

conduct: many of its terms, such as 'morbid interest,' have no clear meaning; and there is no

explanation of crucial terms such as 'violence.' Consequently, video producers and retailers
will be forced to guess at the meaning and scope of the Statute ....
").
49. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, Mo., 329 F.3d 954, 956 (8th
Cir. 2003).
50. Id. at 958 (quoting Turner Brdcst. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994))
(emphasis added).
51. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).

Number 2]

MEDIUM-SPECIFICLAWS

required cable system operators to carry free, over-the-air broadcast
channels. 2
Similarly, this evidentiary judicial reasoning about proving the
effectiveness and efficacy of censorship-based remedies pervades the
rulings of the Supreme Court in the area of commercial speech, 3 in which
it has stated that "a governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on
commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and
that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material degree. 5 4 Under
the four-pronged test for determining whether a restriction on commercial
speech is constitutional, articulated more than a quarter-century ago by the
Supreme Court in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service
Commission,55 one of the burdens that the government must prove is
"whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted., 56 It is here where the government must put forth real evidenceas the Supreme Court has written, "[t]his burden is not satisfied by mere
speculation or conjecture"57-- that the problem in question will be
remedied and alleviated to a material degree.
This standard of proof recently was applied by then-Judge Samuel A.
Alito of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in striking
down a Pennsylvania statute known as Act 199 that prohibited, in the name
of stopping abusive and underage drinking, the advertising of prices of
alcoholic beverages in college newspapers.5 Writing for a unanimous
appellate panel in Pitt News v. Pappert, Alito observed that "[i]n
contending that underage and abusive drinking will fall if alcoholic
beverage ads are eliminated from just those media affiliated with
educational institutions, the Commonwealth relies on nothing more than
'speculation' and 'conjecture."' 5 9 Quoting from Supreme Court precedent,
Alito added that "the Commonwealth has not shown that [Act 199]
combats underage or abusive drinking 'to a material degree,' or that the law

52. See id. at 664.
53. See DONALD E. LIVELY ET AL., FIRST AMENDMENT LAW: CASES, COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES, AND DIALOGUES 201-27 (2003) (discussing the commercial speech doctrine
and noting, among other things, that "commercial speech, or speech which proposes a
commercial transaction" has "traditionally received less First Amendment protection" than
other forms of expression such as political speech); Russell L. Weaver & Donald E. Lively,
UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 74-84 (2003) (providing an overview of the
commercial speech doctrine).
54. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993) (emphasis added).

55. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
56. Id. at 566.
57. Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770 (emphasis added).
58. Pitt News v. Pappert, 379 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2004).

59. Id. at 107-08.
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provides anything more than 'ineffective or remote support for the
60
government's purposes."
Akin to the laws that are the focus of this Article-medium-specific
regulations (i.e., regulations that target a specific medium like television or
video games) that single out a particular type of content conveyed on that
medium (i.e., violent images and storylines)-the Pennsylvania statute at
issue in Pitt News v. Pappert also was a medium-specific statute that
focused on a specific form of content conveyed on that medium. This is
relevant because, in determining that the censorial remedy of Act 199
failed to materially alleviate problems of underage and abusive drinking,
Judge Alito emphasized the wide variety of sources other than college
newspapers where students could still learn about the prices of alcohol.
Alito wrote that Act 199:
[A]pplies only to advertising in a very narrow sector of the media (i.e.,
media associated with educational institutions), and the
Commonwealth has not pointed to any evidence that eliminating ads in
this narrow sector will do any good. Even if Pitt students do not see
alcoholic beverage ads in The PittNews, they will still be exposed to a
torrent of beer ads on television and the radio, and they will still see
alcoholic beverage ads in other publications, including the other free
weekly Pittsburgh papers that are displayed on campus together with
The PittNews.
This is precisely the same type of underinclusiveness problem that plagues
laws that single out one medium (television, for example) for conveying
content such as violent imagery but that leave unregulated and unlegislated
other varieties of media (movies, video games, and the Internet) to transmit
the same content. In brief, there simply are many other media sources
available for delivering the exact same or very similar brand of content, be
it the prices of alcoholic beverages at the local college bars or the graphic
images of fictional and/or real-life violence, that go unchecked by statutory
regulation.
Judge Richard Posner recognized this trouble more than a half-decade
ago in American Amusement Machine Association v. Kendrick,6 2 the first
case to reach the federal appellate court level involving a statute that
attempted to limit minors' access to violent video games. In this case,
Indianapolis was concerned "with the welfare of the game-playing children
themselves, and not just the welfare of their potential victims. '63 To
address these concerns, the city adopted an ordinance in 2000 that forbade:

60. Id. at 107 (quoting Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515, U.S. 618, 624 (1995);
Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 770).
61. PittNews, 379 F.3d at 107.
62. 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001).
63. Id. at 576.
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[A]ny operator of five or more video-game machines in one place to
allow a minor unaccompanied by a parent, guardian, or other custodian
to use 'an amusement machine that is harmful to minors,' requires
appropriate warning signs, and requires that such machines be
separated by a partition from the other machines in the location and
that their viewing areas be
64 concealed from persons who are on the
other side of the partition.
Unpacking this language, it becomes clear that the reach of the Indianapolis
ordinance extended only to video game arcades, and not to either public
sale at retail stores of video games or to their private use at home. More
significantly, it only applied to violent imagery conveyed on one
medium--"an amusement machine. 65 It was, in other words, a mediumspecific remedy involving a specific category of content (content that,
according to the language adopted by Indianapolis, "predominantly appeals
to minors' morbid interest in violence" 66). Judge Posner explained the
under-inclusiveness failures of such a remedy to the problems allegedly
addressed by the Indianapolis law, reasoning that "[v]iolent video games
played in public places are a tiny fraction of the media violence to which
modem American children are exposed., 67 Writing for a unanimous
appellate court, Posner observed that Indianapolis failed to argue that "the
addition of violent video games to violent movies and television in the
cultural menu of Indianapolis youth significantly increases whatever
dangers media depictions of violence pose to healthy character formation
or peaceable, law-abiding behavior., 68 The social science studies
introduced by Indianapolis to show harm, Posner noted, "are not evidence
that violent video games are any more harmful to the consumer or to the
public safety than violent movies or other violent, but passive,
entertainments. 69
In brief, a statute targeting the consumption of violent imagery in
video games cannot materially remedy whatever alleged problems exist for
the consumption of mediated images of violence in general. This is a
problem because, as one federal appellate court recently observed, the
"Supreme Court has looked skeptically on statutes that exempt certain
speech from regulation, where the exempted speech implicates the very
same concerns as the regulated speech. 7 ° Importantly, other courts
considering the issue have adopted and quoted Judge Posner's observation,

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 573.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1227 (9th Cir. 2005).
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as U.S. District Court Judge James J. Brady did when he wrote, in striking
down Louisiana's video game law in 2006, that "violent video games are
only 'a tiny fraction of the media violence to which modem American
children are exposed." ' ' 71 As described earlier, this led Brady to conclude
that the law was underinclusive.
What lesson, then, can one take away from this? That just as it is
extraordinarily difficult for a legislative body to demonstrate, on the first
step of the two-step evidentiary and causation process described in Part I,
that a particular type of content conveyed on a specific medium, standing
alone and independent of the effects of the same content conveyed on all
other media, causes injury,72 it is arguably even more difficult for a
legislative body to prove that eliminating the conveyance of that content on
a single medium does any good, much less materially alleviates and
remedies the problem.
It is helpful, perhaps, to understand this redress-and-remedy problem
by considering it on a much smaller, micro-level scale: the elimination of a
particular media product (a specific video game, a specific movie title, or a
specific television program) when other products within that medium
convey similar content and are left to circulate in the marketplace of
ideas.73 In particular, Professor Arnold H. Loewy of the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law observed, in a recent law
journal article calling for the end of obscenity law as we know it, that:
It is extremely doubtful that the actual obscenity of a particular book or
movie makes any difference at all in regard to our concern for
community environment, protecting children, or protecting unwilling
adults. If a particular movie theater is showing a sexually-explicit film
that a jury has just declared to be non-obscene, it is likely to have very
nearly the same deleterious effects74as last week's sexually-explicit film
which had been declared obscene.
Likewise, even if the FCC is able to crack down, through its indecency
power, on the proliferation of sexual imagery on over-the-air broadcast
television programming, it currently lacks the statutory authority to censor
such expression on cable television. Significantly, in 2007 several new
cable series-Tell Me You Love Me75 and Californication76 ---were
71. Entm't Software Ass'n v. Foti, 451 F. Supp. 2d 823, 833 (M.D. La. 2006).
72. No court, for instance, has found that video game violence alone causes injury. See
supra note 32 (describing Judge Whyte's reasoning to this effect in Video Software Dealers

Ass'n v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57472, *32 (N.D. Cal. 2007)).
73. See RODNEY SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6-8 (1992) (discussing the
marketplace of ideas metaphor).
74. Arnold H. Loewy, Obscenity: An Outdated Concept for the Twenty-First Century,
10 NExus J. OP. 21, 25 (2005).
75. This show has been described as having "the most graphic sex scenes ever
presented in a serious TV drama." Doug Elfinan, Couples Work Out 'Love' Issues, CHI. SUN
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"cranking their sex scenes up a notch, daring to bare more skin than
viewers have been accustomed to seeing."7 7 Thus, as with regulation of
violence on the medium of video games, the regulation of indecency on the
medium of television is plagued by the problem of underinclusion.78
Making a dent in (much less rolling back) the reality of a sexualized
culture-one spawned in part by "adult erotica moving onto Main Street
America by the mid 1990s,, 79 and one in which children are arguably
increasingly sexualized" and influenced by the likes of Britney Spears 8 'TIMES, Sept. 8, 2007, at 12. Television critic Tom Shales observed that the "sex scenes are,

indeed, unusually explicit and include both male and female frontal nudity (with some use
of prostheses), and though at first blush viewers might feel there are lulls between close
encounters, the sex scenes soon seem seamlessly integrated, as well as strikingly intimate."
Tom Shales, Steamy and Stimulating, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2007, at C 1.
76. See Chris Pursell, Racy 'Californication' Selling Well Overseas, TELEVISION WK.,
Aug. 20, 2007, at 8 (describing Californication,starring David Duchovny, and noting "the
nudity, language and edgy nature of the new show about a self-destructive novelist.").
77. Stephen Battaglio, Steamy Shows Stir Controversy, TV GUIDE, Aug. 20, 2007, at 8,
available at http://www.tvguide.com/news/xxx-sex-tv/070817-02.
78. See Fairman, supra note 17 and accompanying text (describing this
underinclusiveness problem with the FCC's regulation of indecency).
79. Gloria Goodale, This Fall's TV Season is Rated X, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept.
7, 2007, at 11 (citing KEvIN Scorr, THE PORNING OF AMERICA: CHOOSING OUR SEXUAL
FUTURE (forthcoming)).

80. See generally AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE
ON THE SEXUALIZATION OF GIRLS (2007), http://www.apa.org/pi/wpo/sexualizationrep.pdf.
See also, Sharon Jayson, Are Girls Becoming 'Sexualized Images'?; Group Sees Risk To
Mental Health, USA TODAY, Feb. 20, 2007, at 5D (discussing the Report, which focuses on
"a variety of media, from television and movies to song lyrics, and examined advertising
showing body-baring doll clothes for preschoolers, tweens posing in suggestive ways in
magazines and the sexual antics of young celebrity role models," and which defines
"sexualization" as transpiring "when a person's value comes only from her/his sexual appeal
or behavior, to the exclusion of other characteristics, and when a person is sexually
objectified, e.g., made into a thing for another's sexual use"); Press Release, American
Psychological Ass'n, Sexualization of Girls is Linked to Common Mental Health Problems
in Girls and Women-Eating Disorders, Low Self-Esteem, and Depression; An APA Task
Force Reports, Feb. 19, 2007, available at http://www.apa.org/releases/sexualization.html
(stating that the Report found the "sexualization of girls in all forms of media including
visual media and other forms of media such as music lyrics abound' and that the Report
concluded "the proliferation of sexualized images of girls and young women in advertising,
merchandising, and media is harmful to girls' self-image and healthy development" (internal
quotations omitted)).
81. Spears recently appeared on MTV "dressing like a lingerie model as she dirtydanced with the requisite army of male companions while lip-syncing through her first
single, 'Gimme More,' a relatively tuneless attempt at a sexy come-on..." Jim DeRogatis,
Rihanna Rises Above Brit's Sad Comeback, CHI. SUN TIMES, Sept. 10, 2007, at 44. Cf.Clay
Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Porn in Their Words: Female Leaders in the Adult
Entertainment Industry Address Free Speech, Censorship, Feminism, Culture and the
Mainstreaming of Adult Content, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 255, 291 (2006) (quoting
leading adult movie star Stormy Daniels for the proposition that adult entertainment has
mainstreamed in the United States due, in part, to "MTV and Britney Spears. She was
dancing on stage in outfits that I wouldn't wear on stage.").
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is simply beyond the FCC's ability to address with a medium-specific law.
Even if, for instance, the FCC could today limit the dissemination of
sexually suggestive and/or graphic lyrics on terrestrial radio with indecency
rules that force stations to play, during non-safe-harbor hours, 8 2 the socalled radio edit versions 83 of songs, like Avril Lavigne's 2007 hit
"Girlfriend, ' 84 in which some words are bleeped out, a minor who
somehow could not figure out just what was being said (a seemingly simple
task with many songs) can easily find both the text of the unedited song
lyrics and the artist's performance of the unedited song on the Internet and
easily download the latter to a computer or iPod. 85
The central problem, then, is this: medium-specific, content-based
laws aimed at sexual and/or violent expression are, almost inevitably,
underinclusive remedies that fail to materially alleviate the supposed
problems and social ills they are designed to address. This does not mean,
however, that these laws are inevitably unconstitutional. Why? Because as
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently observed,
"there is no general First Amendment prohibition on the under-inclusive
regulation of speech. '' 86 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has similarly observed, in considering the concept of
82. The FCC defines the safe-harbor period as "the time period between 10 p.m. and 6
a.m., local time. During this time period, a station may air indecent and/or profane
material." Federal Communications Commission, Obscenity, Indecency & Profanity Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/FAQ.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2008).
83. See Citadel BroadcastingCompany, Memorandum Opinion and Order 17 F.C.C.R.
483, paras. 2,3 (2002) (using the term "'radio edit' version" to describe an edited version of
the Eminem song The Real Slim Shady intended for radio airplay).
84. The song is "about a woman who tells a guy to make his loser girlfriend disappear
so she can show him what good sex is really like. Or as she sneers: 'In a second, you'll be
wrapped around my finger, cause I can do it better!"' David Brooks, New Breed of Tough
Loners, TIMES UNION, July 10, 2007, at A9. It has been described as "a perfect example of
radio excess: A kind-of-catchy Toni Basil rip-off tops the charts and removes any shred of
anti-establishment cred from an otherwise-mainstream teen superstar, forcing us, eventually,
to turn the dial (until we start liking it again in a few weeks)." Kevin Joy, Ear-Itating;
GratingSongs Make Us Wonder Why They Were Ever Popular,COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July
10, 2007, at 8D. Despite such negative critiques, it hit number one on the Billboard charts.
See, e.g., 'Girlfriend' Takes the Top Spot on Billboard's Music Chart This Week,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES FREE PRESS, May 2, 2007, at E5 (listing the song as the number one
single on the "Billboard hot 100").
85. The unedited lyrics to Avril Lavigne's hit song Girlfriendinclude the Canadian pop
star singing, "Don't pretend, I think you know I'm danm precious, And hell yeah, I'm the
motherfucking princess." While the word "fucking" is partially obscured on radio airplay
on many stations, the complete and unedited version of the lyrics are easily found online.
Lyrics,
Lavigne-Girifriend
Avril
See
CompleteAlbumLyrics.Com,
(last
http://www.completealbumlyrics.com/lyric/131233/Avril+Lavigne+Girlfriend.html
visited Mar. 11, 2008); AZLyrics.Com, Avril Lavigne Lyrics - Girlfriend,
http://www.azlyrics.com/lyrics/avrillavigne/giriffiend.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2008).
86. Chaker v. Crogan, 428 F.3d 1215, 1227 (9th Cir. 2005).
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underinclusivness in the context of the constitutionality of the federal donot-call registry, that "the First Amendment does not require that the
all aspects of a problem before it can make progress
government regulate
87
front.,
on any
Similarly, another federal appellate court-the Fourth Circuitopined in 2005 that:
The concept of underinclusiveness needs to be approached with some
caution, however. Holding an underinclusive classification to violate
the First Amendment can chase government into overbroad restraints
of speech. Thus, a speech restriction
88 with a limited reach is not doomed
to fail First Amendment scrutiny.
All of these opinions suggest that courts do possess at least some
leeway in terms of allowing incremental legislative tactics and
approaches-approaches that, for instance, initially regulate a particular
type of content on one medium and then gradually expand the approach
across other media-when addressing larger social problems allegedly
caused by consumption of media content. In particular, the Fourth Circuit's
contention that judicial overemphasis of underinclusiveness "can chase
government into overbroad restraints of speech" 89 shows the potential
Catch-22 nature of the situation facing legislative bodies. A law that is too
limited in reach can be deemed underinclusive, but a law that sweeps up
too much content may be deemed overbroad and thus unconstitutional. In
particular, as the Supreme Court observed in 2002 when striking down
portions of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 that extended
"the federal prohibition against child pornography to sexually explicit
images that appear to depict minors but were produced without using any
real children," 90 the "Constitution gives significant protection from
overbroad laws that chill speech within the First Amendment's vast and
privileged sphere." 9 1 A law is overbroad, the Supreme Court noted at the
time, "if it prohibits a substantial amount of protected expression. 92 The
concern underlying the overbreadth doctrine, as Justice Scalia recently
wrote, is "that the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or
'chill' constitutionally protected speech., 93 Under the overbreadth doctrine,

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Mainstream Mktg. Servs. v. FTC, 358 F.3d 1228, 1238 (10th Cir. 2004).
Nat'l Fed'n of Blind v. FTC, 420 F.3d 331, 345 (4th Cir. 2005).
Id.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 239 (2002).
Id. at244.
Id.
Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003).
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which allows a facial challenge to a statute,94 the Supreme Court has held
that:
[T]he showing that a law punishes a "substantial" amount of protected
free speech, "judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate
sweep," suffices to invalidate all enforcement of that law "until and
unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to
remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected
expression.""5
If courts like those that have struck down laws targeting violent
images in video games continue to vigorously consider the underinclusive
nature of the remedy provided by such statutes, then legislators are
arguably boxed in by and between the inclusiveness and overbreadth
doctrines. In a nutshell, they are damned if they do too little to address,
through censorship-based legislation, the harms allegedly caused by
viewing sexual and violent content, and they are damned if they do too
much and draft vastly sweeping laws that cut across media (intermedia
laws, as compared to an intramedium approach) or that too expansively
define the allegedly harmful material they attempt to regulate.
III. THE BROADER PROBLEM OF PROVING REDRESS OF HARMS:
WHAT-AND How MUCH-EVIDENCE WILL SUFFICE?
As Part II illustrates, courts have made it abundantly clear in recent
years that governmental entities that curb speech in the name of curing
supposed ills and harms caused by that same expression must demonstrate
laws "will in fact alleviate these harms in a
that their medium-specific
96
direct and material way.",
What, however, they have failed to make clear is just how this
evidentiary burden is to be satisfied by those governmental entities.
Although legislative bodies know from the U.S. Supreme Court that "mere
speculation or conjecture' 97 of redress won't suffice, there is little
substantive or tangible guidance beyond such vagaries.
The unresolved question thus is: What evidence does it take, in court,
for the government to prove the efficacy of its medium-specific legislative
responses to harm allegedly caused by watching, hearing, and otherwise
consuming sexual or violent media content?
The difficulty of demonstrating the effectiveness of a mediumspecific law is immense. Consider, for instance, a law limiting minors'
94. See generally LIVELY ET AL, supra note 56, at 85-86 (describing the concept of
facial challenges to statutes on grounds of both vagueness and overbreadth).
95. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. at 118-19 (2003) (citations omitted).
96. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, Mo., 329 F.3d 954, 956 (8th
Cir. 2003).
97. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993).
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access to video games that depict violence. Would a long-term,
correlational study showing a drop in childhood "aggressiveness"however that term might be defined, let alone in the language that a judge,
not a social scientist, could tolerate sufficiently to escape vagueness
issues-in a specific state, subsequent to the passage and after the adoption
of such a law in that state, cut the legal muster in terms of proof?98 How
significant, statistical or otherwise, would the drop need to be in order to
withstand judicial review? How would researchers control for, in such a
complex real-world setting, other variables that also might contribute to or
correlate with any drop that might be demonstrated? The questions go on
and on.
Of course, it would likely be impossible to even conduct such longterm studies on the effectiveness of a regulation like this. Why? Because
just as soon as the law were to take effect, the Entertainment Software
Association99 and similar trade associations representing the video game
industry'0 0 would immediately seek a temporary restraining order

98. Even if a correlation is ever found between the implementation of a law restricting
minors' access to violent video games and a drop in crime, it must be emphasized
correlations "do not necessarily indicate a causal relationship." David H. Weaver, Basic
Statistical Tools, in MASS COMMUNICATION RESEARCH AND THEORY 147, 161 (Guido H.
Stempel, III et al. eds., 2003). In order to prove actual causality:
we [must] be able to establish that the correlation between our variables is
nonspurious (that it holds even when we control for as many other factors as
possible), but also that the cause preceded the effect in time and that there is a
plausible rationale for why one variable should be a cause of another. Even if all
these conditions are met, a causal relationship cannot be proven by one study. Id
99. This organization describes itself on its Web site as:
[T]he U.S. association exclusively dedicated to serving the business and public
affairs needs of companies that publish video and computer games for video game
consoles, personal computers, and the Internet. ESA members collectively
account for more than 90 percent of the $7.4 billion in entertainment software sold
in the U.S. in 2006, and billions more in export sales of U.S.-made entertainment
software.
Entertainment Software Association, About the Entertainment Software Association,
http://www.theesa.com/about/index.php (last visited Mar. 11, 2008).
100. Another leading trade association related to the video game industry is the
Entertainment Merchants Association, which describes itself on its Web site as:
[T]he not-for-profit international trade association dedicated to advancing the
interests of the $33 billion home entertainment industry. EMA represents
approximately 600 companies throughout the United States, Canada, and other
nations. Its members operate approximately 20,000 retail outlets in the U.S. that
sell and/or rent DVDs and computer and console video games and digitally
distributed versions of these products. Membership comprises the full spectrum
of retailers (from single-store specialists to multi-line mass merchants, and both
brick and mortar and online stores), distributors, the home video divisions of
major and independent motion picture studios, and other related businesses that
constitute and support the home entertainment industry. EMA was established in
April 2006 through the merger of the Video Software Dealers Association
(VSDA) and the Interactive Entertainment Merchants Association (IEMA).
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(followed, of course, by requests for both preliminary and permanent
injunctions) stopping its enforcement. Given that courts have again and
again granted such injunctions, there never would be any opportunity to
even test the effectiveness of the law.'' Much like the Catch-22 between
underinclusive remedies and overbroad laws discussed in Part II, the
predicament here is: How can one test the effectiveness of a law if the law
is never given the chance to go into effect in the first place? One is left, in
such a situation, with little more than the very same "speculation ' °2 and
"conjecture"'0 3 that courts have not tolerated.
In declaring unconstitutional the video game statute adopted by
Indianapolis, Judge Richard Posner wrote for the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that, when it comes to proving harm (the
first step of the two-step evidentiary and causation quandary set forth in the
Introduction), "[w]e need not speculate on what evidence might be offered.
• . [to] bring the ordinance into conformity with First Amendment
principles."' 4 In this vein, it is disappointing that, when it comes to the
second step of this evidentiary process, courts have not "speculated" more
about what evidence will suffice to prove the efficacy of a legislative
remedy censoring sexual or violent content on a particular medium.
Experimental research evidence, in particular, would be nearly
impossible to generate. There does not exist, of course, an experimental
research laboratory at some university for testing the efficacy of laws on a
group of college-aged sophomores (an irrelevant group to start with if the
FCC and states are concerned with the effects of speech on minors, not
adults) earning extra credit for their not-so-voluntary participation in the
study! Social science experimentation, in brief, simply does not provide the
means to an answer on this legal question whether a medium-specific law
remedies a harm supposedly caused by speech.
It is worth returning on this point to the start of this Article and the
Second Circuit's observation that the FCC failed to provide evidence to
demonstrate that its ban on the broadcast of fleeting expletives would
"remedy"' 0 5 whatever problem such isolated use of curse words might have
on children. 10 6 Would lack of exposure to a fleeting expletive on a TV
program really improve a child's long-term development, when compared

Entertainment Merchants Association, About EMA,
_ema.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2008).
101. See cases cited supra note 33.
102. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770 (1993).

http://www.entmerch.org/about

103. Id.
104. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 579 (7th Cir. 2001).
105. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 461 (2d Cir. 2007).
106. See supra notes 2-7 and accompanying text.
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to children who were exposed to such language on a TV program? No
university would ever allow an experiment that randomly divided a
collection of local elementary school children into two groups, subjecting
one group of kids in the so-called "experimental group"' 10 7 to exposure to a
TV program that contained an isolated and fleeting utterance of an
expletive like "fuck," while the remainder of kids, placed in the "control
group, ' 0 watched the exact same program minus the fleeting expletive. 10 9
Not only would it be impossible to prove, in the long term, that the children
who did not hear the word were somehow better off or less harmed than
those who were not exposed to it (the result the FCC would like to
demonstrate), but it would be preposterous to believe that any university's
institutional review board would allow an experiment to take place that
intentionally exposed young children to offensive language that (according
to the FCC) would harm them." 0 As this illustrates, social science
experiments simply are irrelevant in proving the benefits the FCC seeks
through censorship of fleeting expletives.
Social scientists often search, through both experimental and survey
research, for potential harms related to or caused by exposure to media
messages, such as the viewing by children of television or video game
violence."' But on the question of remedy through censorship-not of
harm caused by speech-useful experiments are impossible to conduct.
107. LISA J. McINTYRE, NEED TO KNOW: SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH METHODS 296
(2005) (defining an experimental group as one that includes "subjects who receive the
experimental treatment. This is sometimes referred to as "treatment group").
108. Id.at 295 (defining a control group as being comprised of "research subjects who
are similar in relevant characteristics to members of the experimental group but who receive
no treatment").
109. Such a structure would mirror that of a standard controlled experiment. As
Professor Lawrence R. Frey and his co-authors write, "experiments typically involve
various conditions or groups that receive differential exposure to the independent variable.
The most basic procedure is to divide research participants into two conditions, one that
receives a manipulation (called a treatment or experimental group) and one that does not
(the control group)." LAWRENCE R. FREY ET AL., INVESTIGATING COMMUNICATION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH METHODS 171 (2000) (emphasis in original).
110. See id. at 147 (discussing the role of institutional review boards and emphasizing
that "an IRB's greatest concern is to ensure that the research study does not cause any undue
harm or hardship to the people participating in the study").

111.

See, e.g., JENNINGS BRYANT & SUSAN THOMPSON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MEDIA

EFFECTS 172 (2002) (observing that numerous "studies examine viewers' exposure to such
violence and attempt to answer the difficult question: What effect does media violence have
on those who consume it?" and that "[r]esearch studies on the effects of viewing violent
media fare have employed a number of different methodologies," including "laboratory
experiments, field experiments, correlational surveys, longitudinal panel studies, natural
experiments and intervention studies"); John L. Sherry, Violent Video Games and
Aggression: Why Can 't We Find Effects, in MASS MEDIA EFFECTS RESEARCH: ADVANCES
THROUGH META-ANALYSIS 245 (Raymond W. Preiss et al. eds., 2007) (describing efforts by

social scientists to locate effects caused by playing violent video games).
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Correlational surveys, in turn, are worthless when trying to prove in court a
cure or remedy, caused by a censorship-based statute, of supposed harms
because "they are ultimately'' unable to demonstrate a causal relationship
with any degree of certainty. 12
In the end, the problem of proving the effectiveness of mediumspecific, censorship-based statutes designed to mitigate the alleged harms
caused by viewing mediated images of sexual and violent content seems
intractable, unless courts are willing to waive, in the name of protecting
minors, the requirement of submitting substantial evidence that the
remedies will, in fact, directly and materially alleviate the supposed
injuries. Real-world data is impossible to gather because the laws in
question are quickly enjoined before they can be implemented," 3 while
experimental research data that is generalizable' 1 4 to real-world settings
cannot be generated.
IV. Too LITTLE, Too LATE? A CALL FOR THE END OF THE
MEDIUM-SPECIFIC REMEDY
"[T]he rich and the privileged have always had their leather-bounded
issues of pornography. But today the local video store and newsstand have
become the poor man's art museum. And now, when we move into this era
of wireless communication, the genie's out of the bottle."' 15
As much as some people might hate to acknowledge or to admit it,
perhaps Hustler publisher Larry Flynt is correct when he says "the genie's
out of the bottle" in the age of wireless communication."l 6 Sexual and
violent expression, be it in the form of images or words, proliferates
112. BRYANT & THOMPSON, supra note 118, at 173 (emphasis added).
113. See cases cited supra note 33 (describing how laws limiting minors' access to
violent video games are consistently enjoined by courts).
114. In the parlance of social scientists, generalizability is referred to as external validity,
a term that "describes our ability to generalize from the results of a research study to the real
world." JAMES H. WATT & SJEF A. VAN DEN BERG, RESEARCH METHODS FOR
COMMUNICATION SCIENCE 59 (1995). The problem with controlled experiments is that the
study may take place in "an artificial situation in which any generalization to the real world
is difficult to justify." Id.
115. Clay Calvert & Robert Richards, Larry Flynt Uncensored: A Dialogue With the
Most ControversialFigure in FirstAmendment Jurisprudence, 9 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
159, 167 (2001).
116. Id. Flynt's sentiment about the proliferation of sexual content was echoed recently
by Joy King, "the woman at Wicked Pictures who helped turn Jenna Jameson into one of the
most recognizable names in the adult industry today." Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards,
Porn in Their Words: Female Leaders in the Adult EntertainmentIndustry Address Free
Speech, Censorship, Feminism, Culture and the MainstreamingofAdult Content, 9 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 255, 266 (2006). As King told the author of this article and a colleague
during a 2006 interview about the adult entertainment industry, "I don't think the industry is
ever going to go away. The genie is out of the bottle. It's not leaving any time soon." Id. at
296.
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everywhere in our culture." 7 And when people (including minors) can
easily produce, transmit and/or receive offensive imagery, '18 either sexual
or violent, in a digital age and on a multitude of media platforms, including
via cell phones,"19 taking medium-specific steps to squelch a particular
form of content seems futile. This Article has illustrated how the current
two-step, evidentiary and causation quandary compounds this problem
significantly. As Part II attempted to demonstrate, medium-specific legal
remedies are almost inevitably underinclusive and ineffective measures that
fail to materially alleviate whatever problems may exist from minors
viewing, hearing, playing or otherwise consuming sexual or violent
content. What is more, as Part III explained, actually proving redress
through such legislative tactics-the second step of the quandary-is a
difficult and daunting task.
It is time, then, to end the medium-specific regulation of sexual and
violent content and, instead, to let technological remedies administered by
parents on an individual and voluntary basis take the place of governmentmandated censorship. For instance, in August 2007, the U.S. Senate
Commerce Committee approved legislation "asking the FCC to oversee the
development of a super V-chip that could screen content on everything
from cell phones to the Internet." 20 Specifically, the Child Safe Viewing
Act of 2007121 calls for the FCC to "initiate a proceeding to consider
measures to encourage or require the use of advanced blocking
technologies that are compatible with various communications devices or
platforms,"'' 22 including technologies that "may be appropriate across a
117. Kathleen Deveny with Raina Kelley, Girls Gone Bad, Paris, Britney, Lindsay &
Nicole: They Seem to be Everywhere and They May Not Be Wearing Underwear.
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 12, 2007, at 40 (writing that "[ljike never before, our kids are being
bombarded by images of oversexed, underdressed celebrities who can't seem to step out of a
car without displaying their well-waxed private parts to photographers" and adding that one
study has "concluded that for white teens, repeated exposure to sexual content in television,
movies and music increases the likelihood of becoming sexually active at an earlier age").
118. Indeed, technology has made it such that minors themselves become child
pornographers when they tape themselves having sex and, in turn, the tape is transmitted via
cell phones and posted on the Internet. See Linda Espenshade, Teens: Watch What You Post
- Experts Warn Sexual Material Can Bring Big Trouble, INTELLIGENCER J.,May 1, 2007, at
Al (describing actual cases and scenarios in which minors who use technology to record
themselves become child pornographers).
119. See, e.g., Tom Lyons, How He Handled Her Photo is a Crime, SARASOTA HERALDTRm., Sept. 2, 2007, at B I (describing how a middle-school boy "faced possible expulsion
because a teacher who confiscated his cell phone found photos showing the kid's girlfriend
in her underwear. The boy hadn't even taken the photos. They had been sent to his phone,"
and noting that "[t]oday, sexy photos can easily be taken by teens, and the photos are easy to
copy, easy to transmit and easy to post online").
120. Brooks Boliek, It's Super V-chip to the Rescue, HOLLYWOOD REP., Apr. 3, 2007.
121. Child Safe Viewing Act, S. 602, 110th Cong. (2007).
122. S. 602 § 3(a).

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 60

wide variety of distribution platforms, including wired, wireless, and
Internet platforms"' 123 and that "may be appropriate across a wide variety of
devices capable of transmitting or receiving video or audio programming,
including television sets, DVD players, VCRs, cable set top boxes, satellite
receivers, and wireless devices.' 24
This represents a technological, intermedia (as opposed to a mediumspecific or intramedia) solution that does not call for censorship of specific
sexual or violent content. Instead, as Senator Mark Pryor (D. - Ark.) wrote
in an official statement in August 2007 after the bill passed the Senate
Commerce Committee, the technology would "expand parents' ability to
protect their children from inappropriate scenes and language on television,
online, and other viewing devices.' ' 125 The danger, of course, with the
development of such technology is that someday the FCC might mandate
its actual use by parents of minors rather than simply require its installation
on communication devices and leave the choice up to parents about
whether or not to employ it. At the very least, however, Pryor seems aware
that medium-specific remedies are of little practical benefit today and that
technology that empowers parents is more desirable. As a Pryor press
release put it in February 2007, "with126over 500 channels and video
streaming, parents could use a little help."'
Ultimately, medium-specific remedies cannot effectively put the twin
genies of sexual and violent expression, in all their myriad forms and along
with all of the alleged injuries some people would like to ascribe to them,
back into their respective bottles and out of the reach of minors. Tamping
down such expression on one medium, when it surely will crop up on
another, simply is fruitless, like engaging in a never-ending arcade game of
Whac-a-Mole.

123. S.602 § 3(b)(1)..
124. S. 602 § 3(b)(2).

125. Press Release, U.S. Senator Mark Pryor, Pryor Measure to Empower Parents Over
Indecency Advances (Aug. 2, 2007), available at http://pryor.senate.gov/newsroom/details

.cfm?id=280332.
126. Press Release, U.S. Senator Mark Pryor, Pryor Targets Technology Advancements
to Expand Education Opportunities for Minorities, Protect Children from Indecency (Feb.
15, 2007), availableat http://pryor.senate.gov/newsroom/details.cfin?id= 2 69340.

